Events recap: The State of Hungary

The State of Hungary brought together leading experts for three focused online panel discussions in the run-up to the April 2026 parliamentary elections.

Scroll down to watch the recorded parts of the events.

The State of Hungary: Democratic Security

The event – first in the series – featured Szabolcs Panyi (VSquare) and Edit Zgut-Przybylska (Institute of Philosophy at the Polish Academy of Sciences). It was moderated by Magda Jakubowska (Res Publica Foundation). The discussion assessed the resilience of democratic institutions, the state of civil society and media and the dynamics of electoral competition under 16 years of Fidesz governance. The conversation centred on six interlocking themes:

• The hybrid regime problem. Although the opposition party Tisza holds a double-digit polling lead, conventional polling is an unreliable guide in a hybrid regime where elections are shaped by mobilisation capacity rather than public opinion alone.
• Electoral system distortion. Gerrymandering means Tisza would need to outperform Fidesz by four to five percentage points more than a simple majority would ordinarily require.
• Civil society and media capture. Panyi traced a systematic campaign of legal harassment from 2014 onwards, modelled on Russian foreign-agent legislation, which progressively suffocated independent journalism and civil society, culminating in a draft ‘transparency law’ that would likely be enacted if Fidesz wins.
• Fear-based mobilisation. Recent tensions between Hungary and Ukraine, including statements by President Zelenskyy, have given Fidesz renewed ammunition to reframe the election around war and national sovereignty, a proven mobilisation tool with its core rural and elderly electorate.
• Russian influence and dual loyalty. Panyi’s investigative reporting revealed that intelligence findings on Russian-linked operatives were suppressed by Viktor Orbán’s apparatus, illustrating the split between a functioning bureaucratic layer still loyal to NATO and the European Union (EU) norms and a governing elite that operates as a de facto Russian proxy.
• Tisza’s cross-ideological coalition. Zgut-Przybylska noted that Tisza’s decentralised ‘island’ model of grassroots organising has produced a historically unusual cross-cutting electorate spanning liberals, conservatives and leftists. 

The State of Hungary: Economic Security

The second episode of our online discussion series brought together Botond Feledy (Red Snow Consulting), Tamás Csiki Varga (John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics) and Zsuzsanna Szabó (independent energy and foreign policy expert), moderated by Magda Jakubowska (Res Publica Foundation). Six principal topics shaped the discussion:

• A near-total collapse of EU-financed public investment. Hungary has failed to meet the conditionality requirements for both the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) cohesion funds and the reconstruction fund, with tens of billions of euros blocked in Brussels and over one million euros per day accumulating in European Court penalties.
• The resulting economic stagnation. Hungary has experienced three consecutive years of near-zero growth, with post-COVID inflation peaking as the highest in the EU and food price inflation at one point exceeding 60 per cent, producing measurable damage to household living standards.
• The geopolitical recomposition of investment flows. With EU funds absent, Chinese capital has partially filled the gap, while the Paks nuclear power plant expansion proceeds with Russian financing, creating a configuration that positions Hungary as structurally dependent on both Moscow and Beijing.
• Critical fossil fuel dependency. Russia supplies over 90 per cent of Hungary’s crude oil via the Druzhba pipeline, with Vladimir Putin publicly signalling that an unfavourable election outcome could trigger supply cuts.
• The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan mechanism. Hungary’s 16.2 billion euro credit request, structured over 49 years with a ten-year payment grace period, remains pending Commission approval and is expected to be withheld until after the elections.
• Speakers also outlined concrete options available to a new government, including leveraging a potential Gazprom contract breach to exit the unfavourable gas deal, restoring ties with Croatia to access alternative crude supply via the Adriatic pipeline and drawing on incoming Romanian and Polish gas imports.

The State of Hungary: Strategic Communication

The final episode in the series examined the strategic communications landscape ahead of Hungary’s 12 April 2026 elections. Speakers Ivan L. Nagy and Zsuzsanna Végh, moderated by Magdalena Góra, framed the contest as a convergence of Fidesz’s weakest electoral position in 15 years and the most competent opposition it has ever faced. Five key themes structured the discussion:

• Tisza’s rise and Péter Magyar’s political formula. Magyar built his base on the 2024 presidential pardon scandal involving a paedophile accomplice, exploiting politically resonant issues including child protection, healthcare, transport infrastructure and corruption. Crucially, he began grassroots campaigning nationwide well before the official campaign period, reclaimed national symbols previously monopolised by Fidesz, and consistently drove rather than reacted to the news cycle.
• Fidesz’s strategic deterioration. The ruling party has exhausted its earlier toolkit of economic patronage, political innovation and credible messaging, and is now deploying unprecedented tools including artificial intelligence as a campaign instrument and, according to Végh, apparent cooperation with Russian campaign strategists.
• Ukraine as a battleground narrative. Fidesz is seeking to make Ukraine the central electoral issue, capitalising on pre-existing anti-Ukrainian sentiment shaped by years of pro-Russian media framing; Magyar, aware that a sharp pro-Ukraine pivot would cost votes, remains deliberately vague, framing the election instead as a referendum on the fate of the Orbán regime.
• Undecided voters and mobilisation dynamics were analysed using data from the Republican Institute: roughly 23 per cent of the electorate remain undecided or unwilling to disclose a preference as of February, with cost of living their primary concern – a terrain that advantages Tisza.
• On the broader information environment, Nagy noted that Hungary’s heavily Fidesz-aligned media landscape still constrains opposition messaging reach, and that Orbán has recently succeeded in briefly dominating the news cycle and shifting attention away from Magyar.