Civil society in Central Europe faces shrinking space, hostile laws, funding barriers and mistrust – undermining democratic resilience amid rising authoritarianism and regional insecurity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Civil society in CEE – specifically in Hungary and Slovakia – faces mounting pressures within increasingly illiberal political systems, hostile legislation and political interference. Because they mainly rely on state funding, over 50% of NGOs in these countries face constraints on their independence and resilience.

• US funding cuts left a major gap for watchdog organisations, with no adequate EU equivalent to replace them. The EU’s Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme – worth just  €1.5 billion for 2021-2027 – is insufficient in both scale and focus. Too much of its funding goes to ‘soft’ projects like town twinnings or sports activities, while initiatives aimed at the protection of democracy are left underfunded.

• This chronic underfunding of the sector, paired with political bias in funding schemes and legal threats like Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Act and Slovakia’s NGO law, contributes to volatile operational conditions that restrict civic space, foster public mistrust by framing CSOs as ‘foreign agents’ or worse.

• To effectively counter democratic backsliding and authoritarian tendencies in challenging security situations, the CEE CSOs need flexible, emergency and core funding schemes, simpler rules, and government-independent funding sources to ensure their institutional resilience. The establishment of CERV contact points should be obligatory in all Member States.

• Key recommendations include: Significant increase to the CERV programme in the 2027-2034 MFF, the appointment of a European Commissioner/Special Representative for Civil Society and an ‘Alarm Platform’.

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Key facts

* Hungary: 19,190 active NGOs (2023, down from 23,450 in 2010); 30-40% of funding from EU, 50-60% from micro-donations.

*Poland: 70,000 NGOs – 60% of funding from public sources, €200 million from 1.5% tax designations (2021).

*Between 2021-2022, Hungarian organisations and municipalities participated in 357 CERV projects, Slovak in 239, Czech in 200 and Polish in 1,648.

*CEE philanthropy: €960 million in annual donations, with potential for €2.13 billion if barriers are removed.

*Legislative threats: Slovakia’s 2025 NGO amendment and Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Act restrict civic space.

Foresight

Funding gaps, bias and red tape limit civil society in crises. Without stronger support in the next EU budget, its role in defending democracy and public trust will remain severely weakened.

INTRODUCTION

Civil society organisations (CSOs) in Central European countries face mounting challenges in increasingly illiberal political systems, where the legitimacy and autonomy of the third sector are frequently undermined, co-opted or deliberately targeted to consolidate political power. These pressures are compounded by the ongoing war in neighbouring Ukraine, which heightens regional insecurity. Rising polarisation and nationalist sentiment further strain the social fabric, while core democratic values – such as the rule of law, equality and freedom of the media – remain under threat. Together, these dynamics erode democratic resilience.

A critical challenge now is how to strengthen security and defence capabilities while embedding a comprehensive but robust societal resilience framework – one that counters authoritarian tendencies, prevents democratic backsliding in volatile security contexts and ensures that value-based measures are consistently applied across all Member States.

CSO funding remains precarious. Over half of NGOs in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia rely entirely on state-funded project lines. Smaller organisations – particularly those with high administrative burdens but close ties to local communities – struggle to compete for larger EU, Norwegian or private sector funding. Structural barriers such as staff shortages, uncompetitive salaries and insufficient resources for administrative development limit their ability to professionalise and grow.

In Hungary and Slovakia, governments have created volatile operational conditions through restrictive legislation and oversight systems. These measures suppress watchdogs, think tanks, independent media and human rights defenders, while encouraging public mistrust by portraying CSOs as ‘foreign agents’ or worse. A similar development is expected in the next parliamentary elections in Czechia. In Poland, the rise of far-right and nationalist parties makes the political situation fragile as well.

Administrative burdens further compound these pressures. Complex application and reporting procedures, repeated audits and protracted disbursement timelines often lead to liquidity issues – especially when EU funds are re-granted through government-affiliated bodies. In such cases – observed most clearly in Hungary and under the previous PiS government in Poland – the risk of corruption, favouritism and unequal access to funding remains high.

Similar dynamics are visible to varying degrees in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania. These obstacles also hinder the public visibility and societal role of CSOs. Alternative sources of funding – such as philanthropy, tax incentives or business partnerships – are often undermined by restrictive legal environments, low public trust and a lack of professional fundraising capacity.

In Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia, 40% of the population distrusts CSOs. In post-communist countries, such distrust is often fuelled by longstanding prejudices portraying foundations as vehicles for money laundering. More recently, disinformation campaigns have introduced a new narrative – framing civil society as ‘foreign agents’ – further eroding public trust and narrowing the civic space.

Inflexible government and EU funding schemes – particularly the absence of emergency mechanisms – prevent CSOs from adapting to crises, including wartime conditions. Long-term development is similarly constrained by the lack of organisational or seed funding to cover core costs, especially salaries and administrative capacity. Yet these are critical to ensuring professionalisation, staff retention and institutional resilience.

Funding disparities undermine democratic resilience in Central and Eastern Europe

Despite being at the forefront of crisis response in recent years, CSOs remain significantly underfunded. A comparative analysis of CERV programme grants from 2021–2024 reveals stark disparities. Organisations in Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary and Romania  – all grappling with mounting democratic challenges – received a combined total of €42 million in grants. In contrast, Belgium alone, being the key beneficiary of umbrella projects, received €42 million during the same period, Germany €15 million, France €6 million, Italy €19 million and Spain €16 million.

So-called ‘Old EU’ Member States continue to receive nearly twice as much CERV funding as their Central and Eastern European counterparts. Among the programme’s 72 Framework Partners – drawn from 14 Member States – 53 are based in just four countries: Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands.

The abrupt reduction or withdrawal of pro-democracy and capacity-building funding from US sources has dealt a serious blow to an already fragile civil society ecosystem in Central and Eastern Europe. Most organisations remain ill-prepared for such sudden changes and lack reliable safeguards or alternative funding sources at the national or EU levels.

In 2022 alone, USAID provided $35 million (approximately €31 million) in grants to support civil society, independent media, the rule of law and civic engagement across Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In comparison, the EU’s CERV programme allocated €56.5 million across two years for similar objectives. The lack of a timely EU response to these reductions poses a direct threat to the vitality of civil society, undermining efforts to strengthen democratic engagement and societal resilience at a time of rising polarisation and extremism.

Conclusion

Strengthening civil society organisations in Central and Eastern Europe is essential to maintaining democratic resilience in the face of political and security threats across the whole EU. Especially, as the rise of nationalism and populism is also a growing problem in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. By increasing and diversifying funding, simplifying administrative procedures and addressing restrictive legislation, the EU can empower CSOs to defend democratic values, restore public trust and contribute meaningfully to the cohesion and resilience of societies in at-risk Member States.

Recommendations:

• Within the new Defence Fund, introduce a democracy-focused budget line – potentially serviced by CERV or similar programmes – to promote societal resilience. This line could support value-oriented projects within the defence budget in the next Multiannual Financial Framework, fostering civic participation and embedding democratic resilience. Such a provision would help ensure that the core values of the Union are upheld across all major EU policy areas – including those prioritised by all Member States.

• Significantly increase the funding allocated to the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme in the 2027-2034 MFF to support civil society organisations (CSOs) operating in at-risk countries.
  

• Fixed and set in advance percentage of the overall EU budget should be allocated to a new aim of shielding (supporting) democracy and rule of law in the EU (in time, it may re-orientate and focus CERV mechanism on more concrete aim to address internal political problems in EU Member States, which in many cases progresses towards authoritarianism, nationalisms and anti-EU rule). The CERV programme should be clearly focused on the support of independent media, watchdog organisations and organisations which have no chance of receiving government support.  Sustaining or expanding CERV and similar value-oriented instruments is essential to realising the EU’s Democracy Shield and maintaining democratic integrity to complement conditionality procedures.

• Enhance flexibility by establishing emergency funding mechanisms available on a rolling basis (pitch-based), enabling CSOs to respond rapidly to urgent needs or crises.

• Launch core funding schemes to cover operational costs for non-profit organisations, particularly in Member States where the third sector is underdeveloped or under threat, thereby protecting such organisations from politically motivated interference.

• Develop a proactive funding approach in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, with increased opportunities for smaller and less experienced organisations that may lack robust fundraising capacity.

• Ensure full EU institutional oversight of grant distribution in at-risk Member States – based on Rule of Law (RoL) Reports – to prevent corruption, clientelism and misuse of funds.

• Appoint a European Commissioner or Special Representative for Civil Society in the President of the EC office to promote structured dialogue between the EU and private donors and foster a trust-based funding environment, and most notably to be positioned at decision-making processes within the Commission.

• Establish an ‘Alarm Platform’ for reporting government misconduct in the allocation and distribution of public and EU funds.

• Strengthen cooperation between EU institutions and private philanthropic actors and companies to develop a shared, trusted and sustainable framework for democracy funding.

• Take a firm stance against ‘foreign agent’ laws and other legal mechanisms that restrict civic space and undermine trust in CSOs.

Authors

Marzenna Guz-Vetter

Magda Jakubowska

Contributors

Team:

Galan Dall, Staś Kaleta, Tomasz Kasprowicz, Anna Kuczyńska, Natalia Kurpiewska, Magdalena Przedmojska, Wojciech Przybylski, Albin Sybera, Luca Soltész and Simon Xiao.

Fellows:

Radu Albu-Comanescu (Romania), Merili Arjakas (Estonia), Alina Bârgăoanu (Romania), Bohdan Bernatskyi (Ukraine), Marysia Ciupka (Poland), Spasimir Domaradzki (Poland/Bulgaria), Martin Ehl (Czechia), Artur Nowak-Far (Poland), Jan Farfał (Poland), Oksana Forostyna (Ukraine), Philipp Fritz (Germany), Ognyan Georgiev (Bulgaria), Marzenna Guz-Vetter (Poland), Jarosław Gwizdak (Poland), Pavel Havlicek (Czechia), Alina Inayeh (Romania), Ruslanas Iržikevičius (Lithuania), Krzysztof Izdebski (Poland), Staś Kaleta (United Kingdom), Matej Kandrík (Slovakia), Christine Karelska (Ukraine), Aliaksei Kazharski (Belarus/Slovakia), Viktoryia Kolchyna (Belarus), Ádám Kolozsi (Hungary),  Filip Konopczyński (Poland), Oleksandr Kostryba (Ukraine), Oleksandr Kraiev (Ukraine),  Adam Leszczyński (Poland), Paweł Marczewski (Poland), Michał Matlak (Poland), Asya Metodieva (Bulgaria), Adrian Mihaltianu (Romania), Eva Mihočková (Slovakia), Malina Mindrutescu (Romania),  Marta Musidłowska (Poland), Mastura Lashkarbekova (Tajikistan/Poland), Iván László Nagy (Hungary), Marco Nemeth (Slovakia), Valeriia Novak (Ukraine), Vitaly Portnikov (Ukraine),  Matej Šimalčík (Slovakia), Jiří Schneider (Czechia), Sandra Sirvydyte (Lithuania), Sigita Struberga (Latvia), Zsuzsanna Szabó (Hungary), Dorka Takacsy (Hungary), Bartosz Wieliński (Poland), Volodymyr Yermolenko (Ukraine), Marcin Zaborowski (Poland) and Edit Zgut-Przybylska (Hungary).

About the project

Visegrad Insight is the main Central European analysis and media platform. It generates future policy directions for Europe and transatlantic partners. Established in 2012 by the Res Publica Foundation.

Foresight on European Values and Democratic Security (FEVDS). This project engages CEE civil society leaders in a foresight-driven debate on the future EU policy developments to protect European values and freedoms.
visegradinsight.eu/foresight-European-values

Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Commission. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

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