CEE developments infused the EU Strategic Agenda with a focus on security and democratic freedoms.

However, the incoming Hungarian EUCO Presidency, coupled with weakening governments in France and Germany and rising right-wing support, will be disruptive to the EU.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While democratic security advocates often demanded to deprive Hungary of its EUCO Presidency, the actual opportunities rest with the upcoming Presidency of Poland (January 2025). EU Values Foresight horizon scanning (spring 2024) brings the following conclusions: 

• EU governments and the Commission must increase action on democratic security and assign more funding for the objective.In particular, they should treat the rule of law through a security prism and launch joint action against disinformation to protect the electoral process and the popular support for Ukraine. Many CEE countries, particularly Poland, have influenced the newly adopted EU Strategic Agenda framing the priorities around security.
• Civil society and political initiatives efforts on democratic security should utilise the upcoming EUCO Presidency of Poland to make the most of its current potential.The European Parliamentary election results strengthened Donald Tusk at home and on the continent, amidst weakening leadership in France and Germany. The Hungarian presidency is expected to be largely ceremonial and focused on political communication.

• Policy debate leaders have to emphasise the costs of non-enlargement to stimulate political momentum for EU accession at home and in candidate countries. Political and civil leaders Accession talks were initiated with both Ukraine and Moldova. The process will be negatively affected by the Hungarian Presidency and the rise of the far-right in the EP.

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Key facts

• EP results strengthened the ruling powers in Poland and Hungary but reinforced expectations of leadership change in Czechia.
• Slovakia’s government accelerated its state capture post-Peter Pellegrini’s victory and the Robert Fico shooting.
• Article 7 proceedings against Poland were dropped.
• Accession talks have begun with Moldova and Ukraine, which has also secured many security agreements.

Foresight

CEE leaders like Donald Tusk will have to play a key role in keeping the EU on track with priorities like enlargement. How difficult this will be will depend on the positions the far-right acquires in the EU, Hungary’s EUCO Presidency, French elections on 7 July and US elections on 5 November.

INTRODUCTION

The following overview of specific areas has been prepared based on our weekly outlooks, which monitor democratic security developments in the CEE, and input from Visegrad Insight fellows from CEE countries.

How CEE politics shapes the policies of the EU

The last EU Strategic Agenda set the direction for the European Union as a foreign policy actor, built on industrial autonomy and the Green Deal agenda. The new Strategic Agenda more heavily prioritises security, democratic freedoms and the rule of law.

This shift is largely the result of Central and Eastern European developments and Poland’s pivotal change in government. The new Polish coalition spearheads a group of countries – including the Baltics, Nordics, Czechia and Romania – which demand that the EU increase defence funding and take strategic action against a rise in Russian hybrid attacks and violent sabotage. Meetings between a re-energised Weimar Triangle have also outlined how and why the EU must become “a geopolitical actor and security provider”. Weimar’s future effectiveness remains unknown until a new French government is formed.

At the heart of this drive has been Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has consolidated support at home by monopolising the topic of security and drawing a strong connection between defence and democracy. Not only has he pitched a €100 billion defence budget for the EU to fund domestic needs, looking to overcome Olaf Scholz’s and Mark Rutte’s fiscal conservatism on EU defence spending, but Poland has established a Russian Influence Investigative Commission and sought to secure its eastern borders.

The question now is how and to what extent CEE will steer that agenda. Budapest will preside over the next EU Council of Ministers from today (1 July) until December 2024, but it is likely to have little impact because the new EU Commission will only just be forming. Rather, the Hungarian Presidency risks stalling the EU’s most important initiatives, most of all the process of enlargement.

While Minister of European Affairs János Bóka has claimed Hungary will prioritise a consistent and merit-based enlargement policy, the reality is that enlargement is only important to Budapest when it concerns its friends. The previous Belgian Presidency rushed to start accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova on 25 June precisely because Hungary was already doing all it could to delay frameworks and discussions. There is also reportedly “no appetite” in the EU executive for Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Oliver Várhelyi to keep his role in the next term.

The Polish Presidency of the EU Council, however, will start from January 2025 and will come at a key time for implementing the strategic agenda. Poland will also already be a key driver of the EU’s direction in the second half of 2024, on account of Donald Tusk’s increasing importance in Europe.

“Donald Tusk has returned to the table of European players. Not only was he handed the responsibility of redistributing top positions in the EU, but the EU’s shift towards investing in defence and preparing for war with Russia is also his achievement,” explains Bartosz Wieliński, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Poland and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Gazeta Wyborcza.

First, the EP elections confirmed support for Tusk’s Civic Coalition Party at home, and so highlighted the progress Poland’s new coalition government has made in its reversal of the Law and Justice Party’s previous state capture.

Second, the Polish Prime Minister led the EPP negotiations with other groups for top EU jobs, the selection of which will benefit CEE security. The re-election of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen guarantees that EU funds will flow to Warsaw. She also displays a strong transatlantic bond alongside Estonian Kaja Kallas, the newly appointed head of EU diplomacy, who is considered aggressively hawkish on Russia. Tusk is now the strongest mainstream party leader in the EPP (centre-right) and has considerable room for collaboration. While he leads on EU decisions with Scholz (left) and Macron (centre), he has also developed relations with Meloni (far right), who supports aspects of Poland’s political agenda.

Third, Tusk is likely to shoulder even more responsibility on the continent should France’s snap elections on 7 July weaken Emmanuel Macron’s position. A right-wing surge following the EP elections and weakening governments in France and Germany may limit progress in the next term. This also means, however, that protagonists of democracy from CEE will be all the more important in ensuring the EP stays the course towards democratic security, enlargement and a geopolitical Europe.

For more on the future of the EP, read our foresight report.

State of Central Europe

POLITICS

Between European Unity and Disunity

For the first time in a decade, Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition (KO) defeated the Law and Justice (PiS) Party in national elections, winning 37% support to PiS’s 36% in the EP elections on 9 June. The ruling coalition won just over 50% support – despite poor results for The Third Way and The Left – and so confirmed its progress at home.

In turn, PiS’s gradual political erosion continued. The party suffered further setbacks in local support – for instance losing power in the Podlaskie voivodeship – and faced multiple, high-level scandals: see Daniel Obajtek and Tomasz Szmydt. Corruption allegations also engulfed the Sovereign Poland Party with which PiS governed Poland between 2015-2023.

The ruling coalition continued to prioritise effectiveness in security and economic policy, conducting a series of internal audits and investigations into the corrupt practices of the previous PiS government, including a special commission for Russian infiltration which is likely to press charges against top opposition politicians.

While the President and the ruling coalition are largely aligned on security and foreign policy direction, however, presidential vetoes have effectively stymied the passing of other important legislation – this is why, for example, the Polish government delayed work on a bid to scrap the PiS-controlled National Council of the Judiciary. The President will remain an obstacle until the presidential elections in May 2025, when Duda is likely to be replaced.

“In domestic politics, Tusk must take control of his multi-member government coalition, at least bring about the legalisation of civil partnerships and speed up the process of holding the previous PiS government accountable,” says Bartosz Wieliński, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Poland and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Gazeta Wyborcza.

In Hungary, Péter Magyar has confirmed his status as a serious rival to Viktor Orbán, ending the days of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s politically unopposed rule. Fidesz still won 45% support in the EP elections, but it was the party’s worst result since its accession in 2010. Only four months after Magyar’s emergence, his Tisza Party won 30% support and 7 of Hungary’s 21 seats in the EP.

Fidesz also suffered from more scandals, after President Tamas Sulyok was sued for contributing to an illegal transfer of Hungarian farmland to foreigners in the early 2000s, less than four months after the previous president’s resignation. Most of Magyar’s new support, however, has come at the cost of other opposition parties. After terrible EP election results, the entire leadership of the progressive-liberal Momentum Party announced their resignation, while the Democratic Coalition Party decided to shut down its shadow government.

In Slovakia, Peter Pellegrini defeated the country’s former top diplomat Ivan Korčok and won the second round of the Presidential elections with 53% support. The narrow win for Prime Minister Robert Fico’s ally has enabled the Smer-led cabinet to accelerate its state capture, no longer facing opposition from liberal incumbent Zuzana Čaputová.

“After the presidential elections, Fico’s government continues to cement its power, using new legislation against the independent public broadcaster [RTVS], NGOs and the cultural sphere, as well as acting against unfavourable judges and opposition members,” explains Eva Mihočková, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Slovakia and Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy SFPA.

While the ruling powers of the other Visegrád Group (V4) members consolidated their control, Czechia’s ruling SPOLU coalition continues to trail the ANO Party of ex-populist leader and billionaire Andrej Babiš. In the EP elections, the ANO party won 26% support to SPOLU’s 22%, and similar results are expected in the national elections in Autumn  2025. The selection of new Czech MEPs also reflects far colder attitudes towards the EU, after a campaign dominated by anti-EU themes.

Elsewhere in CEE, Romania’s ruling coalition maintained its notably stable support by winning 49% of votes in the EP elections; Lithuania’s Gitanas Nausėda was re-elected as President with 75% support in a run-off against Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė; Bulgaria’s political parties are once again struggling to form government after centre-right GERB party won the country’s snap elections with 24% of votes; Croatia’s centre-right Croatian Democratic Union reached an agreement to form a government with the far-right nationalist Homeland Movement; and Serbia’s Prime Minister Miloš Vučević announced the new ministers of his government, including two pro-Russian, US-sanctioned politicians and a far-right party leader as cabinet ministers.

SECURITY

Collective Defence or Unilateral Action

Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare and violent sabotage in Europe in recent months. Across the continent, Moscow orchestrated more cyber attacks – take the Russian GRU unit APT28 and its attack on political parties in Germany, Poland and Czechia, or the thousands of bomb threat emails received across Slovak schools – as well as more acts of arson, such as the setting ablaze of shopping centres in Warsaw and Vilnius.

In Ukraine, Russia capitalised on Western delays in providing aid, making significant gains in the Northern Kharkiv region in particular. The frontline seems to have now stabilised, however, as aid packages start to take tangible effect, and thanks to widespread agreement that Ukraine should be able to strike valid targets within Russian borders. Notable funding includes the US $60 billion aid package; the EU €50 billion Ukraine facility; a plethora of security agreements; a G7 deal to use Russian frozen assets to supply a further $50 billion to Ukraine from 2025; and a similar EU initiative to raise €1.4 billion.

Poland and the Baltic states took the lead on defence by continuing to supply financial aid to Ukraine – and contributing heavily to initiatives like Czechia’s ammunition gathering scheme, which has now delivered its first shipment – but also shoring up borders with Russia and Belarus.

Poland announced that it will spend €2.3 billion on its Eastern borders and penned a letter to the chairman of the EU calling for a renewed defensive line along the Eastern flank. This comes as Russia and Belarus continue to orchestrate state-sponsored illegal border crossings, transport military equipment through Belarus and carry out joint nuclear drills. Deputy Minister of Interior and Administration of Poland Maciej Duszczyk has warned that “The EU may dissolve within 10-15 years if migration is not brought under control.” 

NATO’s presence on the Eastern flank is growing, as displayed by the fact that German, French and British troops are now stationed in the Baltics. A new Rheinmetall ammunition factory in Lithuania is also soon to be announced, and work has begun on building the largest NATO base on the continent in Romania, which will be able to host 10,000 soldiers and civilians by 2030.

Romania has become a defence hub in the Black Sea, hosting the first-ever NATO-led air policing missions in the region, among many other exercises, and a new National Maintenance Centre for the HIMARS system in Bacǎu. Romania’s defence market is now worth $8.6 billion and is projected to grow at a CAGR of more than 2% until 2030. President Klaus Iohannis failed in his bid to become the next NATO Secretary General, however, losing to outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte.

Other international initiatives included NATO’s new Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine plan, which aims for the alliance to take over from the US in coordinating military aid to Ukraine. The plan exemplifies a shift in focus towards more predictable and sustainable defence. The FT reported in May that NATO could provide less than 5% of the air defence necessary to protect its CEE members in case of a full-scale attack, while the Democracy Perception Index said that 34% of people worldwide say NATO is not helping Ukraine enough.

NATO’s new plan is also laying the groundwork in case of a Donald Trump election victory in the Autumn. In his latest threat against the EU, the former president blasted the scale of US support for Ukraine and said that he would immediately “have that settled” if re-elected. Such a prospect is also why the Biden administration struck a 10-year security deal with Kyiv, and why it is now preparing to move a Patriot air defence system from Israel to Ukraine. Read our foresight report for more on how European democracies are to survive a new Trump age.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Enlarged EU or the Ivory-Tower

“Recent months have shown that both Ukraine and the EU now take accession processes more seriously. Political statements have transformed into effective technical decisions, the adoption of negotiation frameworks, the creation of negotiation groups and active preparation for bilateral screenings,” says Oleksandr Kostryba, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Ukraine and member of the Center of Economic Recovery platform and EasyBusiness think tank.

Accession talks were formally initiated with both Ukraine and Moldova in the last quarter, but it remains to be seen how such progress will be affected by the Hungarian Presidency of the

EU Council and by a surge in anti-Ukraine voices, anti-systemic narratives and Green Deal criticism.

While the centre held and the European People’s Party (EPP) was a clear winner, the far-right made significant gains across Europe in the EP elections, at the cost of the Greens and the Renew group. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the Identity and Democracy (ID) group now control 141 seats in the chamber.

German AfD announced a Sovereignist political group with many extreme-right member parties from CEE including Konfederacja (Poland), SOS (Romania), Our Homeland (Hungary), Republika (Slovakia) and Revival (Bulgaria).

Viktor Orbán has created another CEE-based grouping, the Patriots for Europe which includes Hungary’s Fidesz, Austria’s far-right Freedom Party (FPO), Portugal’s Chega Party and Czechia’s Andrej Babiš’s ANO 2011 Party – which recently left the Renew group. Discussions are continuing about whether Janez Janša’s Slovenian Democrats and Slovakia’s Smer Party will join, although it is unclear whether such a group would have members from at least member countries.

The V4 remained stagnant because of political and security misalignment between Donald Tusk and Viktor Orbán, who still plays on a long-term bet that a Donald Trump 2024 victory and consequent global power reshuffle will allow Hungary to influence the EU agenda while benefiting from Chinese or Russian patronage.

On the one hand, Western powers have become increasingly frustrated with Hungary and its efforts to torpedo NATO and EU initiatives. Budapest has blocked European Peace Facility reimbursements for almost a year, including a recent €6.6 billion package, and also delayed confirmation of the negotiating framework for Ukraine’s EU accession. As a result, Jens Stoltenberg agreed to Hungary having an opt-out from NATO’s Ukraine initiatives, in exchange for Viktor Orbán’s pledge not to block any related decisions.

The Bucharest Nine (B9) is also considering excluding Hungary from future meetings, after representatives repeatedly vetoed conclusions at previous summits, and President Sulyok decided to skip the most recent Riga Summit. This is part of wider disunity in the group, which has recently struggled to reach a consensus on the type of support Ukraine needs to defeat Russia’s war.

On the other hand, Hungary’s closer ties with the East were clearly on display during Xi Jinping’s European tour, when the Chinese President visited Budapest and secured 18 new cooperation agreements, ranging from the construction of a new electric vehicle factory and new nuclear energy cooperation to agreements between Chinese and Hungarian media groups. The nations have also reached deals for Chinese police officers to patrol and Chinese surveillance to be used in Hungary. 

Similarly long-lasting ties have been established with Serbia and Slovakia. Xi Jinping and Aleksandar Vučić signed an agreement on a “shared future” during the President’s visit to Belgrade, the first of its kind for a Balkan country, while members of Robert Fico’s cabinet visited Beijing in early June to further elevate the Sino-Slovakian “strategic partnership”.

“China is again on a charm offensive in the CEE. The goal is to revive cooperation on a bilateral level with individual CEE states, as well as on the level of the 14+1 platform (China-CEEC Cooperation Platform). The cooperation was largely dormant over the past five years, as CEE countries grew disillusioned with China in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and Beijing’s tacit support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Examples of rapprochement with the region include CCP Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to Hungary and Serbia (China’s traditional allies), a trip by Polish President Andrzej Duda to Beijing, and the upcoming visit to China by Slovak PM Robert Fico. Chinese companies are also becoming highly influential actors in the region’s automotive industry and its transition to EV production. Expect the CEE’s exposure to China to grow in the near term, despite rhetorical nods to de-risking,” says Matej Šimalčík, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Slovakia and the Executive Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies.

The influence of the Global South was felt at Ukraine’s Peace Summit in Switzerland. 82 out of the 101 participants endorsed the final communiqué supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and defining Kyiv’s formula as the main framework for peace negotiations. Saudi Arabia, India and South Africa did not support the final declaration, however, and China was not present at all. The summit highlighted the two, increasingly divergent camps in world politics, and also that the Kremlin has no real intention to negotiate peace terms.

This was also made clear during Vladimir Putin’s visits to China – his first trip abroad after Russia’s sham presidential elections – and North Korea, where the two nations signed their first defence pact. The replacement of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu with Deputy Prime Minister and economist Andrei Belousov was also widely viewed as putting Russia on a more permanent war footing. 

Russia’s meddling in Europe’s eastern flank was also on display in Moldova, as Moscow strives to derail the country’s significant progress towards EU accession. The UK, US and Canada signed a joint statement accusing Russia of targeting Moldova with an increased wave of hybrid attacks in the run-up to 20 October, when the nation will vote in its referendum on EU membership and presidential elections.

How Russian influence can throw a country off its path towards EU membership was clearly exemplified in Georgia and the government’s passing of the much-criticised, Kremlin-inspired “foreign influence” bill.

ENERGY & TECH

Between Dependence and Interdependence

In addition to the sanctions already imposed on Russia, the EU passed measures to target Moscow’s lucrative liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. Rather than an outright ban on Russian LNG imports, the sanctions act against the fuel’s transshipments via EU ports. The Commission also proposed to mirror all Russian sanctions on Belarus, a significant route for circumventing EU restrictions.

Czechia and Germany have planned to set up a high-level group to eliminate the last 20% of supplies coming from Moscow to Europe. Germany will scrap a gas storage levy at its border from January 2025, after a Czech-led CEE coalition said it harmed their efforts to ditch Russian gas.

Moreover, Ukrainian attacks on Russian soil have left the world’s biggest petrostate running low on fuel. Diesel prices for Russian consumers have risen by more than 10% in recent months, while petrol costs are up more than 20% since January. Kremlin-owned gas giant Gazprom revealed a net loss of €6.29 billion in 2023 – its first annual loss in two decades.

Of course, Ukraine’s own energy infrastructure was also heavily targeted by Russian attacks. New financing for infrastructure restoration was a central topic at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, as was European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s announcement that the EU has signed agreements with banks worth €1.4 billion in a bid to attract private sector investment in Ukraine.

“The battles on the frontline have become harsher due to the renewed Russian offensive. Ukraine also faces a new critical stage of electricity shortages, which hugely influences businesses and citizens. In this context, the URC 2024 was a big success, as it helped to inspire Ukraine’s communities and businesses that were active participants,” says Valeriia Novak, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Ukraine and Programme Manager for USAID RANG.

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski said that Poland in particular wants to be a “hub for Ukrainian reconstruction, just as it is now a hub for military assistance,” explaining that Poland is in a “privileged position” to help, because of “Language and cultural closeness, the fact that we will conduct [EU accession talks with Ukraine] during the Polish Presidency of the EU next year, and the fact that we have experience in negotiating the accession treaty.”

The EU’s investigation into alleged unfair subsidies for Chinese electric cars culminated in the imposition of punitive tariffs as high as 38.1%. In response, China has threatened to unleash tariffs as high as 25% on imported cars with large engines, and further talks are expected.

In response to EU plans to make use of Russian frozen assets, a Russian court has frozen the local assets of Germany’s Deutsche Bank AG and Commerzbank AG, as well as Italy’s UniCredit SpA, under lawsuits totalling over €1 billion filed by a Gazprom PJSC venture.

Other significant developments in the region included Robert Fico’s announcing of plans to build the largest nuclear power station in Slovakia; Donald Tusk moving forward with the CPK project; Czech energy and media oligarch Daniel Křetínský acquiring 20% of German ThyssenKrupp Steel Europe; Lithuania, Germany and Japan signing the Berlin Declaration on joint strengthening of e-fuel technologies; Serbia giving Rio Tinto the green light to develop Europe’s largest lithium mine in the country; and Moldova becoming energy independent from Transnistria, via increased gas trade with the international market and new high-voltage lines to Romania’s electricity.

ECONOMY

Prosperity for All or the Few

Poland’s economy grew more slowly than expected in the last quarter, but monthly data and short-term forecasts show that consumption and Polish – and global – manufacturing are also gradually recovering. The EC forecasted that Poland’s GDP will rise to 2.8% by the end of 2024 and 3.4% by 2025.

Similar growth is expected in the other V4 members: Czechia’s GDP is forecast to rise to 1.2% in 2024 and 2.8% in 2025; Hungary to 2.4% in 2024 and 3.5% in 2025; and Slovakia to 2.2% in 2024 and 2.9% in 2025. Czechia and Poland also had the lowest unemployment rates in the EU in April.

Poland and CEE have also looked to upgrade their economic growth strategies to new defence posture and costs. This included a debate on a dual-use policy, prioritising investment where it increases defence potential. In this context, Poland, the Baltics and Finland discussed the development of drone swarms for border protection. Common EU projects that link innovation to defence have also come to the fore, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative.

Poland continued to prioritise new EU budget revenue streams, as indicated by Donald Tusk’s public applause of Ursula von der Leyen’s policies during the pandemic. Poland will use the fact that the Commission intervened beyond rigid treaty rules and provided health policy solutions to pivot on defence spending. Finance Minister Andrzej Domański has said Poland will face the EU’s infringement procedure over its excessive deficit in 2023 – along with Slovakia, Hungary, France, Italy, Belgium and Malta – but that he expects the EU executive to be lenient in its budget cut demands, on the grounds that Poland needs to increase its defence spending.

The European Commission presented its new framework for the REPowerEU funds. Due to the framework’s results-focused approach and strict regulatory expectations, member states progressed very slowly with the use of funds. The Hungarian government still has to fulfil all of its super-milestones and it is increasingly likely that most Hungarian subsidies will be lost.

Under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, however, the Commission concluded that Poland has satisfactorily fulfilled two of its super milestones, allowing for the disbursement of €6.3 billion, from a total of up to €59.8 billion available. Moreover, the Polish government renegotiated the national recovery plan with the Commission to remove many burdens, such as taxes on car owners.

The Commission also concluded that Poland has fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, allowing Poland to access up to €76.5 billion for its 2021–2027 Cohesion Policy, European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture, and Home Affairs funding.

Away from the V4, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which underpins the Reform and Growth Plan proposed by the Commission in November 2023. This new instrument should support EU-related reforms and economic growth in the region and is expected to provide up to  €6 billion for the EU’s six Western Balkan partners from 2024-2027.

The timeline for Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession into the eurozone is likely to be pushed back to at least late 2025.

INFORMATION SOVEREIGNTY

Plurality of Sources

On the RSF’s 2024 Index, Poland improved its ranking by 10 places to come 47th globally. Bulgaria also improved by 12 places and Ukraine by 18. Media freedom is safest in the Baltics, with Estonia the best-placed country in CEE at 6th globally.

Slovakia and Czechia, however, fell by twelve and three places respectively, while Hungary remains the worst country for media freedom in the V4, placing 67th globally. Such statistics were reinforced by The Media Freedom Poll 2024, which reported that an average of 58% of citizens in the V4 are concerned about media freedom. These numbers are highest in Slovakia and Hungary, at 65% and 62% respectively.

The sharp downturn in Slovakia’s media freedom scores was hardly surprising, given the Smer-led government’s ongoing media takeover. This includes the thinly-veiled replacement of the publicly-funded RTVS with a new Slovak Television and Radio (STaR), as well as state interference at the PPF-owned Markíza, the largest commercial television station in Slovakia. Staff remain on strike alert after management agreed to open a dialogue with the journalist who threatened to protest against the suspension of the most popular political programme in the country, Na telo.

The EU is also set to launch a probe into the PPF Group’s €2.2 billion sale of a controlling stake in its telecommunications assets to the UAE’s e&. There are concerns that state involvement gave e& an unfair edge over the competition, in a deal that would mark a major milestone for the UAE and provide access to telecommunications infrastructure in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Serbia.

Robert Fico’s assassination attempt was widely interpreted as a manifestation of growing political tensions in CEE, but it also strengthened the government‘s media crackdown, as Slovakia’s power circle used the shooting to blame the liberal, independent media and proliferate their own vitriolic narratives.

In Hungary, Fidesz and the pro-government camp spent €4.3 million on Meta and Google ads between the start of 2024 and 1 June – more than any other party in the EU and more than five times what all 14 of Hungary’s opposition parties and their associated media spent. Fidesz and its proxies were also the main purveyors of hostile disinformation in Hungary, responsible for 98.6% of the total €2 million spent on promoting such narratives. 46% of spending was assigned to ads against opposition hopeful Péter Magyar, while 34% was dedicated to the narrative that “European pro-war politicians and their Hungarian servants want to start World War III.”

The advent of the EP elections also saw a rise in Russian and Chinese cyberattacks and espionage. In addition to the examples already mentioned, the pro-Russian hacker group HackNeT exemplified Moscow’s cyberwarfare by hitting several Dutch political parties and disrupting EP election voting in the Netherlands. The European Court of Auditors’ website was also shut down by cyberattacks. Beforehand, four Germans were arrested – among many others – for spying for Chinese secret services, including the assistant to Maximilian Krah, the AfD’s lead candidate in the EP elections.

Pro-Russian or pro-Chinese disinformers also came to the fore in CEE. Tibor Eliot Rostas, editor-in-chief of the Zem&Vek magazine and Slovakia’s so-called disinformer-in-chief, visited China on a junket trip aimed at fostering ties between Beijing and foreign journalists. Artyom Marchevskiy, a pro-Kremlin Voice of Europe propagandist from Ukraine, fled to Slovakia after he was added to Czechia’s national sanctions list.

In response, the European Commission moved to enforce Czech sanctions against Voice of Europe, and three other pro-Russian entities, across Europe. The EU also discussed a ban prohibiting political parties, think tanks and other groups from accepting funding from Russia. Multiple private searches have also been conducted in relation to the Russiagate case, and EU Regulators are examining whether Telegram – often used by pro-Kremlin accounts to spread disinformation – should qualify as a major online platform under the EU’s new content moderation law.

Poland and the US launched an international operation based in Warsaw to help Ukraine counter Russian disinformation. The Ukraine Communications Group includes representatives from 12 countries, including Ukraine, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and other NATO members.

As part of the new government’s promise to reveal the full picture of Pegasus’s use during the Law and Justice Party era, the Polish Justice Minister and Attorney General Adam Bodnar also presented a report which revealed that as many as 578 people had been monitored via the Pegasus spyware between 2017 and 2022.

RULE OF LAW

State Capture or Independence

When Ursula von der Leyen spoke with Donald Tusk in Katowice at the European Economic Congress, she reiterated that she had picked Poland as one of the highlights of her re-election campaign because “the turning point for Europe is in Poland.” Poland has proven to be an example of how to counter state capture, as evidenced by the dropping of Article 7 proceedings against the country.

Through a letter addressed to Commission VP Věra Jourová, Hungarian EU Affairs Minister János Bóka argued that the fact Poland is yet to finalise its judicial reforms is proof that the Commission now accepts political commitments without concrete deadlines.

Nonetheless, where Poland is a nation in transit towards democracy, Hungary remains the only EU member state with the Article 7 procedure hanging over it. The European Commission also extended its legal procedure against Hungary’s controversial “sovereignty-protection law”, while the European Court of Justice fined Hungary €200 million for the government’s failure to comply with EU asylum rules.

SOCIETY

Polarisation or Cohesion

Smer-led changes to independent media and judicial reforms are supported by less than a third of Slovaks, according to a recent survey by the Ipsos agency, but Slovakia’s society is also highly polarised. The most trusted politicians are former President Zuzana Čaputová and successor Peter Pellegrini, with both enjoying the trust of 49% of Slovak citizens, while Robert Fico is trusted by 37% of the population.

Slovak society is also very polarised in its opinion on foreign-political threats to the country, with Russia perceived to be a threat by 49% of Slovaks and the US considered a threat by 41%. However, the country’s support for Euro-Atlantic structures remains high, with 72% of Slovaks in support of remaining in the EU and 69% favouring NATO membership.

50% of respondents to a poll on Zelenskyy’s performance believe the President hasn’t fulfilled his promises, due to dishonest and corrupt team members. For example, Ukraine’s Minister of Agricultural Policy was exposed for taking state land worth 291 million UAH and attempting to take land worth another 190 million. Mykola Solskyi was later released from custody after a 75 million UAH bail and offered his resignation.

Important rallies took place in a number of countries. Magyar’s countrywide campaign in Hungary involved multiple rallies with thousands of attendees; many thousands of Georgians continued to conduct peaceful protests against their government; and a protest took place in front of the Prague HQ of the financial group PPF.

CEE think tanks quarterly review

Russia’s war with Ukraine continued to dominate defence policy research. Reports outlined updates on the frontline (in April and May) as well as strategy, challenges and NATO influence. Research also sought to address the effects on Ukrainian society (including the prominent topic of conscription) and the many negative impacts of war (ranging from Russia’s starvation tactics to climate damage). Moreover, much policy research was published on changes in regional cooperation, communication and security structure.

At the same time, there was a significant increase in research on the prospect of Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. Papers assessed France’s leadership ambitions and the potential for Britain, Poland and Ukraine to shape a post-war Europe. Indeed, Poland emerged as a key force for Ukraine’s (human rights-centred) reconstruction, which has great economic potential to benefit the EU. There was also much attention on Ukraine’s Peace Summit, food security, Euro-Atlantic future, global support – and whether or not parties are really ready to disengage.

Policy research also explored what the EU can achieve in the digital power game and fight against disinformation. Usual propaganda culprits included Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Viktor Orbán, but there was also a reported increase in transnational repression of authoritarian critics.

As expected, China and Russia dominated FIMI policy research, with reports outlining their aggressive foreign policies and attempts at undermining democracy worldwide. For Russia, these focused on the weaponisation of gas supplies (and Europe’s continued use but phasing out of Russian fuel) as well as nuclear blackmail. For China, these focused on interference in a variety of sectors, ranging from security to technology (through flying drones and EVs) to the environment (through the Belt and Road Initiative). Reports assessed different national perspectives on China and how it looks to win over public opinion, but also how Europe can strengthen its digital competition and how CEE can contribute to a stronger European-China approach.

Enlargement was the running theme in policy research on EU governance. In the context of the 20th anniversary of the Big Bang Enlargement – and assessments on how far countries like Poland have progressed and converged with the West – Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration came to the fore, following democratic developments in both countries and the start of accession talks. This was accompanied by reports on the potential issues countries may face in accession (take Serbia), but also the negative impact of putting enlargement on hold and the need to unblock EU decision-making.

The importance of the next MEPs from CEE was also documented, coming from a brave region with great potential for economic growth and building on the Polish example of how to defend against authoritarian abuses of power and the rule of law. Reports highlighted that such protagonists will be particularly important amidst the rise in extreme parties (and their funding) and the potential issues they may bring about (including democratic erosion, China and workers’ rights, to mention only a few).

Authors:

Wojciech Przybylski and Staś Kaleta

Contributors:

Team: Galan Dall, Katarzyna Górska, Magda Jakubowska, Jacek Karaczun, Tomasz Kasprowicz, Anna Kuczyńska, Natalia Kurpiewska, Magdalena Przedmojska, Luca Soltész, Kamila Szymańska, Albin Sybera.

Fellows: Radu Albu-Comanescu (Romania), Merili Arjakas (Estonia), Alina Bârgăoanu (Romania), Bohdan Bernatskyi (Ukraine), Marysia Ciupka (Poland), Spasimir Domaradzki (Poland/Bulgaria), Martin Ehl (Czechia), Artur Nowak-Far (Poland), Jan Farfał (Poland), Oksana Forostyna (Ukraine), Philipp Fritz (Germany), Ognyan Georgiev (Bulgaria), Marzenna Guz-Vetter (Poland), Jarosław Gwizdak (Poland), Pavel Havlicek (Czechia), Alina Inayeh (Romania), Ruslanas Iržikevičius (Lithuania), Krzysztof Izdebski (Poland), Staś Kaleta (United Kingdom), Matej Kandrík (Slovakia), Christine Karelska (Ukraine), Aliaksei Kazharski (Belarus/Slovakia), Viktoryia Kolchyna (Belarus), Ádám Kolozsi (Hungary),  Filip Konopczyński (Poland), Oleksandr Kostryba (Ukraine), Oleksandr Kraiev (Ukraine),  Adam Leszczyński (Poland), Paweł Marczewski (Poland), Michał Matlak (Poland), Asya Metodieva (Bulgaria), Adrian Mihaltianu (Romania), Eva Mihočková (Slovakia), Malina Mindrutescu (Romania),  Marta Musidłowska (Poland), Mastura Lashkarbekova (Tajikistan/Poland), Iván László Nagy (Hungary), Marco Nemeth (Slovakia), Valeriia Novak (Ukraine), Vitaly Portnikov (Ukraine),  Matej Šimalčík (Slovakia), Jiří Schneider (Czechia), Sandra Sirvydyte (Lithuania), Sigita Struberga (Latvia), Zsuzsanna Szabó (Hungary), Dorka Takacsy (Hungary), Bartosz Wieliński (Poland), Volodymyr Yermolenko (Ukraine), Michał Zabłocki (Poland), Marcin Zaborowski (Poland) and Edit Zgut-Przybylska (Hungary).

About the Project

Visegrad Insight is the main Central European analysis and media platform. It generates future policy directions for Europe and transatlantic partners. Established in 2012 by the Res Publica Foundation.

Foresight on European Values and Democratic Security (FEVDS). This project engages CEE civil society leaders in a foresight-driven debate on the future EU policy developments to protect European values and freedoms.
visegradinsight.eu/foresight-European-values

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