EU Values Foresight
Think Tank
Civil Society – Missing Element of Defence Preparedness
27 October 2025
In the shadow of Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine, Europe’s leaders have rediscovered the art of sabre-rattling. But how credible or sustainable it will be without the full support of the democratic bedrock – myriads of civil society actors across the Union? The upcoming four-year electoral cycle will tell, and it is not too late to do something about it.
Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission’s self-portraying herself as the iron-willed president, has already poured billions into bolstering the continent’s defence posture – 150 billion euros through the Readiness 2030 framework alone. Tanks are supposed to roll off production lines faster, drone walls are rising up along EU eastern borders, and industrial plans hum with the promise of self-sufficiency. That’s all much needed toolbox but it still misses the substance – amid this frenzy of militarisation, the EU fails to weave civil society into the fabric of its defence posture.
It’s as if Brussels believes resilience springs solely from steel and silicon, not from the sinews of society itself.
The newly published special Visegrad Insight report ‘Democracies at War. War on Democracies’ and a policy brief ‘How Civil Society Can Strengthen Preparedness and Defence’ authored by Gora– lays bare this disconnect. Prepared in the context of the EU Values Foresight, we argue that the Union needs to put democratic security anchored in the European values at the heart of the defence efforts, especially in public communication and that the upcoming EU’s Civil Society Strategy and its Preparedness Union Strategy exist in parallel universes.
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We don’t see eye to eye on the risks
The upcoming civil society paper, judging by the policy discourse around the consultative process, will emphasise democratic participation and funding for NGOs. If so, it will be hugely disconnected from the newly revolutionised the EU’s approach to deterrence and industrial ramp-up. How does the Commission imagine up-keeping democratic will for the defence strategies if it would not at least try to link civil society to the to political priority?
The risks are twofold. First, programming funds for civil society that would not rewire its own strategic mindset risks funding a growing divide on a strategy – feeding a destructive opposition, while Europe needs cohesive approach to strategic challenges.
Second, it undercuts the potential of strategic communication which can harness the democratic will for defending the union to master difficult policy objectives in the longer run. So far, the EU underperforms.
Von der Leyen’s State of the Union address in September didn’t even utter the word ‘preparedness,’ let alone link it to civil society’s role. This is not a mere oversight but a strategic blunder that undermines Europe’s ability to weather the storms ahead.
New dimensions, old strategies
Meanwhile, the threats facing Europe are not just Russian divisions advancing on Ukraine’s frontlines with EU borders on Putin’s horizon. We are currently ensnared in a world of grey-zone conflict – terms that echo Cold War relics but describe today’s reality with chilling precision. The International Institute for Strategic Studies map from August 2025, which documents the sabotage operations against Europe’s critical infrastructure, is just one dimension of the actual battlefronts. Europeans should remember that it is nothing new.
During the Cold War the West has developed the basic toolkit of democratic and economic security, which eventually outlasted the Russian imperialist ambitions and allowed for the last 30 years of unprecedented progress. Why did it last? Because it was built on strong foundations, matching democratic values and economic partnerships with security partners who invest in hard power toolkit for similarly democratic objectives.
In other words, one shall not do business with thy foes! And building up a military industrial complex makes sense only if this effort is strongly embedded in democratic ideals. Otherwise, we look into an abyss of nationalist militarism or petty isolationism – not absent among today’s European political class.
Time to put all chips on the tab
In this arena, traditional defence – punishment through firepower – falls short. What’s needed is ‘deterrence by denial,’ making societies so resilient that aggression becomes futile, as Goran Buldioski argues in the above mentioned policy brief.
And here’s where civil society shines. Organisations like scout groups, volunteer firefighters, or drone hobbyists are not just community do-gooders. Brussels and member states must recognise them as untapped reservoirs of skills and trust. Take Estonia’s Defence League, where weekend warriors turn gaming enthusiasm into drone defence training. Lithuanian and Czech volunteers make the bulk of elves movement successfully fending off Russian internet trolling. Or the Czech Firemen’s Association, with its 70,000 volunteers augmenting state services, as the above-mentioned policy brief notes. These are not just abstract ideals but practical, low-cost bulwarks against disruption.
Yet the Commission’s communication strategy treats civil society as an afterthought. The Preparedness Union Strategy mentions it three times in 30 action points, and not at all in any of its implementation goals. It falls into Chinese and Russian legalistic narratives that oust Even the nod to youth programmes via Erasmus+ feels tokenistic, likely to vanish in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations. Brussels trumpets its ‘whole-of-society’ approach – borrowed from Nordic models – but in practice, it’s whole-of-government at best, ignoring the grassroots that could make it real.
Can’t have a jigsaw without a missing piece
This myopia matters profoundly. Without civil society, Europe’s defence risks becoming a brittle shell. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) build trust networks that counter disinformation, foster social cohesion, and sustain democratic legitimacy amid threats. They’re the ones who can mobilise midlife workers, retirees, and influencers – from pop stars to teachers – to normalise preparedness. Ukrainian civil society, as detailed in recent studies, has crowdsourced intelligence and bolstered defences against Russian incursions.
In order to upkeep the new strategic direction, political leaders must harness the massive power of democracy itself. In consequence, the security community must think politically as well.
Hard defence is vital, but it is stupid to ignore the potential of radical-right saboteurs – like Germany’s AfD or France’s RN and Orbán’s Fidesz – who erode unity from within. And who opposes them most efficiently if not the democratic ideals driven actors of civil society who work tirelessly building bridges against the backdrop of divisive stunts on the internal borders by the far right. We have just documented such struggle in a long form report from one of such cases from the Polish-German twin town.
A credible defence posture needs a solid social contract – one that includes everyone willing to stand by democracy and resist domination by autocrats. And a centrepiece of democratic engagement are myriads of civil society leaders and powerful strategic communication.
The best time to act is now
This message is for everyone, but in particular for Ursula von der Leyen. Dear Madam President, connect the dots, please! Link defence posture and industrial plans with civil society upgrades in every speech, every strategy. Otherwise, Europe’s preparedness will remain a hollow slogan – strong on paper, weak in the face of cunning foes.
The continent’s security requires budgets that are truly an expression of our values. It’s about binding citizens to a common cause. Ignore that, and we invite the grey zone to claim us.
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