4 March 2022
Unfortunately, there are many – both internal and international – undesirable factors, phenomena and processes which would have a substantial impact on the political stability and economic development of the Western Balkans.
It certainly relates to the ‘unfinished’ democratisation. This state of affairs is characterised, among others, by autocratic modus operandi of political leaders, who are stronger than the law, state institutions and citizens; lack of effective control mechanisms over government (as a result society is unable to impose on decision-makers certain standards of political responsibility, rule of law and professionalism); political populism; unsatisfactory level of the rule of law; election fraud; the limited transition of political power; corruption; nepotism; clientelism, etc.
The scale and specificity of the above elements leads to the conclusion that Western Balkans states are actually struggling with the phenomenon of ‘state capture’, represented by the existence of ‘untouchable’ political and business elites, which accumulate political power, social prestige and material wealth.
The above considerations of the challenges and threats for the Western Balkans lead to the conclusion that the most likely, pessimistic scenario is a long term continuation of the unsatisfactory and potentially explosive status quo. This means, among others a perpetually ‘unfinished’ democratisation, protracted stabilitocracy and growing dissatisfaction of Balkan citizens. In some cases, a political regression cannot be ruled out either. This scenario also relates to prolonged regional disintegration and the declining prospect of EU membership.
In a situation of persistent pessimism and frustration among the inhabitants of the region (additionally reinforced by the wide ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing energy and security crises at the East of Europe) combined with the lack of vision for a brighter future shared by many, it cannot be ruled out that in the near future the WB countries will become the arena of further political crises and demonstrations. Moreover, in some cases, the political debate between the government, political opposition and dissatisfied citizens would radicalise and take place in the streets, not at the parliamentary buildings. In other words, the next mass protests of dissatisfied Balkan citizens seem to be a very real perspective.
It is a serious risk that the process of European integration of the six Balkan countries would be stuck for a long time in the midway formula of the Berlin Process (i.e., economic cooperation, combined with the expansion of communication and transport routes, but without formal EU membership).
The unattractive status of non-EU countries also means that Western Balkan countries will likely adapt slower to the needs of the pro–ecological energy policy set out in the European Green Deal. This unfavourable situation would deepen the differences between the EU and Western Balkans also in the field of environmental protection and the use of renewable energy sources.
There is a risk that Serbia, trapped between its nation-building Kosovo myth and complex political conditions, without an actual compromise on the table, can function for years both without Kosovo and EU membership. It would be a worst-case scenario, and until the stance changes, it would perpetually block the completion of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans and challenge the future stability of this region.
The possible political and socio-economic stagnation and the lack of tangible progress towards EU membership would also lead to the maintenance of non-transparent Russian influence and the growth of Chinese economic and political presence in the Western Balkans.
Although Russia is not able to create political dynamics in the WB region, it has considerable potential to fuel regional conflicts and use them for its own geopolitical purposes. Russia’s involvement in the Western Balkans, therefore, remains a challenge for regional stability, democratisation and integration. It may also complicate the process of Euro-Atlantic integration of the WB countries.
Cooperation with China also seems to be risky from the medium-to-long-term perspective. That is because the growing indebtedness of the Balkan states towards China would lead to a debt trap. The acquisition of strategic communication hubs and industrial centres by Chinese capital is also possible. Additionally, the use of Chinese technologies with lower environmental standards and implementation of its extensive economic model would result in excessive pollution of air, soil and water, directly threatening the health of the residents. The dangerous dependence on Chinese IT technologies cannot be excluded either.
Last but not least, the development of economic relations with Beijing carries the risk that the Western Balkans countries will find themselves in the Chinese sphere of political influence. The implementation of this scenario would create a serious challenge not only for the WB countries but also for the entire EU.
A less likely scenario is the ‘return of history’ i.e. the thaw of ‘frozen’ Balkan conflicts followed by the next phase of the region’s destabilisation and fragmentation. There is no doubt that this scenario poses a direct threat to the stability, security and prosperity of the Western Balkans.
The inclusion of this scenario justifies the fact that despite decades of post-conflict transformation, the Western Balkans remain a region where the lack of hostilities still does not constitute an irrefutable guarantee of peace while the likelihood of further acts of armed violence cannot be definitively rejected. For that reason, the political, economic and even military engagement of the international community aimed at stabilisation of the WB region is still necessary.
What is more, the stability of the Western Balkans is definitely not immune from the global balance of power. As a result, risk persists that at the time of the future major systemic changes at the continental or global level, armed conflicts could again break out in the Western Balkans, and that the fate of some Balkan statehoods and their territorial shape would depend not only on the will of the Balkan nations but also on the direction of the evolution of the post-post-Cold War international order. That is because history – contrary to the belief of some modern philosophers – never ‘ends’, for good or bad.
To sum up, there is no doubt that these three ‘dark future’ scenarios overlap, condition and merge with each other. It is therefore very likely that the future developments in the Western Balkans would contain elements of all of these challenging scenarios.
Narrated by Konrad Pawłowski.
Thank you to the International Visegrad Fund and the National Endowment for Democracy for their support
