Recommendations

5 July 2021

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Democratic security

1 – Include a democratic security perspective to ensure good governance, transparency and participative support of all stakeholders to mitigate risks related to corruption, environmental risks and the polarisation of the information space. Put emphasis on the highest standards as the 3SI cannot contribute to the buildup of national oligarchies with the use of EU funds.

3SI Civil Society Forum
2 – The hosts of 3SI annual summits should include a 3SI Civil Society Forum (CSF) as one of three flagship formats — next to political and business stages — thus including democratic security influencers and the media. The three platforms should interact.

The 3SI CSF must be inclusive across the board of existing divisions (in the region and globally). The pan-regional level may help establish a dialogue between civil society actors otherwise nationally divided. It should be lightweight administratively and fit for the needs of digital age networking. Thus, the CSF would include groups such as:
• Informal movements, experts as well as official civil society organisations,
• Expert and educational networks,
• Pro-bono lawyers and advocacy groups,
• Cities, towns and local governments.

3 – 3SI should invest in new generations of civil society influencers in all 3SI countries to build bottom-up policy expertise for the general public and specifically for the political parties to ensure long term objectives of the 3SI. The CSF must build up expertise and media awareness in respective countries, regardless of the 3SI CSF summits, and include a focused list of good governance goals complementary to the 3SI like CSOs participation, transparency of investments, resilient information space, cybersecurity, environmental protections or the strengthening of environmental human rights.

4 – The 3SI Civil Society Forum should:
• work towards the 3SI’s clarity of purpose and bring forward distinctive features of this regional format,
• help set the actual agenda for institutional investors,
• build an understanding of short and long term 3SI goals to ensure that it is driven by success-stories,
• map and monitor economic exposure in the 3SI.

5 – The CSF needs to define language on democratic progress or backsliding that helps understand what’s legitimate or not in terms of democratic innovation (or disruption). The CSF should help ensure that the EU’s Article 7 no longer needs to apply since it hampers the investment credibility of the region.

Opportunity for Europe
6 – The EU should consider 3SI as an opportunity for Europe to attract US attention and investment. The EU should once again become a magnet for investment from within and from abroad by attracting more funds from the 3SI national partners, the U.S. and globally.

7 – 3SI should emphasise the European dimension of the initiative also by setting more ambitious goals regarding the Core Network Corridors in the Trans-European Transport Network plan with milestones in 2030 and 2050.

8 – The EU should consider 3SI as one of its macro-regional strategies to embrace the potential of 3SI in building European transnational networks while diminishing the risks of Eurosceptic narratives in the region.

Poland’s role
9 – Poland should take historical narratives out of the equation to defuse scepticism from countries like Czechia, Slovakia or Lithuania about Poland’s domination. The Intermarium narrative and Jagiellonian foreign policy are hurting the pragmatic approach of the 3SI.

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