The next five years will be the make-or-break moment for the European promise to ensure peace, stability and prosperity.
Depending on the ability to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and the nature of transatlantic relations, the European Union will have to adapt to a quickly changing global environment to protect its democratic foundations.
The EU’s solidarity with Ukraine will reverberate with the democratic processes across Europe. Similarly, the shape of American politics will affect European electoral trajectories.
Such critical junctures are particularly pronounced in Central Europe – primarily in the four Visegrad democracies, where the tensions over the rule of law and security have already altered the Union’s political dynamics. Threat perceptions and trends amplified in the region are more likely to impact the future of the block overall, and the regional perspective – however rarely coherent – must therefore be considered in planning the future EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029.
Since its onset, the European project has been primarily a peacebuilding effort. In line with this original objective, the EU agenda has developed further to also include prosperity, democracy and foreign policy. But this does not mean that peace and democracy are certainties, as reminded by the ongoing war in Ukraine, tragic events in Israel or the continuing efforts to restore the rule of law on the continent.
Given the ongoing global pressures from climate change to the new geopolitical conflicts, the 2023 Granada declaration of the European Council reiterated the EU’s promise of peace and prosperity.
However, too little emphasis has been placed on the internal processes that ensure that democratic foundations are protected along with economic and security resilience.
This report identifies four major scenarios that develop along potential transatlantic unity-disunity and the future of the EU perspective on the war in Ukraine. The fallout of each scenario on the EU’s democratic security agenda is significant.
Given the ongoing war and deteriorating situation in the Middle East, defence coordination, economic focus and natural resources supply are understandably prioritised.
The “Resilient EU2030” report by the Spanish presidency dwells on the areas that will keep a peaceful and prosperous Europe together. It mentions “democracy” in the past tense and only once on 81 pages in a section about multilateralism.
Similarly, the Commission President’s 2023 State of the Union address mentions the term only four times while it refers to “security” 15 times – each instance in a context disconnected from the realm of EU values.
However, the future ambitions of the EU are inherently dependent on democratic performance. The global EU directions are prone to uncertainties embedded in electoral processes.
The 2023 elections in Poland and Slovakia brought into light a delicate fabric of values and interests. Voters in both countries decided against underperformance – also in the area of EU funds. In effect, Poland pushed away illiberalism and nationalist narrative that was endangering further EU cooperation with Ukraine. In contrast, Slovakia brought back the same actors who were previously rejected for the rule of law misconduct. The leaders of the new government have been declaring a U-turn on Slovakia’s position towards military aid for the neighbouring Ukraine.
In this light, contributors to this report have been mapping trends and potential triggers of change relevant to the “Democracy Action Plan”, the “EU Citizenship Report 2020,” and the “EU Rule of Law Report”. The report offers a specific perspective that indicates which democratic agenda pillars might require more focus along shifting geopolitical landscapes.
Given the geopolitical rationale, each of the presented four scenarios would likely alter the democratic security agenda in ways that should prompt relevant anticipatory policy planning in the following areas:
Align EU values and interests together in key strategic EU plans to ensure competitive economies and prosperity for all.
Evaluate the EU impact in the domains of the rule of law, accounting rules, and investment screening on democratic action plan areas with special regard for free and fair elections.
Emphasise therule of law’s effect on member states economic performance to ensure prosperity for all and prevent state capture.
Conduct an EU-wide public inquiry into domestic and foreign surveillance. Safeguard journalists’ environment to prevent democratic system abuse and protect EU intellectual property against theft.
Foster European donors to align on EU-wide values advancement and joint funding for civil society, given the outflow of transatlantic donors from CEE member states.
Shape the European Media Freedom Act for enforcement, considering countries where the restoration of pluralism in public service media will first require political interference (Poland or Hungary).
Build policies on the successful cases of youth and female participation in the democratic process and sponsor action against SLAPPs.
Innovate policies for civic education in the EU and neighbourhood, including Ukraine’s veterans. Consider future Ukraine’s impact on Russia’s future democratisation.
Ensure that member states develop an interest in the future Ukraine victory sponsored by European resources and are insulated against Russia’s potential implosion.
Ensure strategic communication on the EU’s mental health programmes to debunk health-related disinformation and ensure grassroots effectiveness.
ABOUT THIS PROJECT:
This project aims to promote democratic values and strengthen democratic security in Central European states through our framework. We’ll engage in activities such as scenario-building, yearly foresight reports, conferences, and media appearances to improve discourse on EU values and foster collaboration within civil society. It develops a CEE-wide public foresight debate on future scenarios for democracy, freedoms, elections, and social cohesion, bringing together thought leaders, academia, and policy-makers. Our primary goal is to address the decline in public debate caused by a lack of information sovereignty, limited trust in democratic institutions and political polarisation, offering solutions and reinforcing support for democratic values.
It is supported by the European Commission’s Europe for Citizens Programme and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (CERV) framework cooperation.
For our readers, we perform quarterly briefs which monitor the state of democratic security in Central Europe.
This project aims to enhance the quality of public and expert-level debate on the future policy directions in the EU while nurturing collaboration amongst civil society as a means to shore up democratic resilience in the region. This project is financed by the European Union.
Below find a limited selection of trends in key areas, but for a more complete picture, download the report.
CEE Democratic Security
Source: Lieve van Woensel, Kjeld van Wieringen and Mario Damen, EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity. EPRS, 2021/2022.
Democracy and Citizenship
Attitudes toward liberal democracy 73% of the Czech respondents believe that having liberal democracy with regular elections and multiparty system is better for their country, while 27% declared that having a strong and decisive leader who does not have to bother with parliament is more beneficial. In Hungary, these numbers are 74% and 26%, respectively; in Slovakia, 67% and 33%; and in Poland 66% and 34%.
Evaluation of democratic governance When asked how democratically their countries are being governed today on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (completely democratic), Central Europeans ranked the democratic governance in their states in the following way: Polish and Slovak respondents gave their states a score of 4.9, Hungarians – 4.3, and Czechs – 5.5.
Participation in politics According to the data gathered by the Economist Intelligence Unit as part of the Democracy Index, the rate of political participation fell in Hungary and Slovakia, remained at the same level in Czechia, and recorded a slight increase in Poland between 2006 and 2022.
Women in political representation In 2023, the share of women in the national houses of parliament in Poland reached 28.3%, 23.0% in Czechia, 22.7% in Slovakia, and 12.6% in Hungary. These indicators for all the CEE countries are below the EU average at 30.8%, and the OECD countries average at 33.8%, and Hungary is the country with the lowest percentage of women in parliament in the EU.
Rule of Law and Illiberalism
Perceived judicial independence In Poland, only 23% of the respondents rate the national justice system as very or fairly good, compared to 33% in Slovakia and 35% in Hungary. Out of the CEE states, the perceived independence of courts and judges among the general public is the highest in Czechia – 65% of the respondents rate the justice system as very or fairly good.
Corruption perception According to Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks 180 countries around the world by their perceived levels of public sector corruption and assigns each state a score between 0 (highly corrupt) and 100 (very clean), corruption perception level has increased in Poland since 2015 and in Hungary since 2012. In 2022, Poland scored 55 and ranked 45th, and Hungary scored 42 and ranked 77th. Slovakia and Czechia both saw a positive trend, as perceived corruption has decreased between 2015 and 2022. In 2022, Slovakia scored 56 on the scale and ranked 49th, and Czechia 56 and ranked 41th.
Media Freedom and Disinformation
Struggle for press freedom and independent media In 2023, the World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters without Borders ranked the situation of press freedom as “satisfactory” in Czechia and Slovakia and “problematic” in Poland and Hungary. Czechia was ranked 14th out of 180 countries evaluated by the index, Slovakia 17th, Poland 57th, and Hungary 72th.
Exposure to disinformation As the EU Barometer Media & News Survey from 2022 shows, CEE citizens’ exposure to disinformation and fake news is particularly pronounced. 28% of the EU citizens declared being very often or often exposed to disinformation and fake news in the previous 7 days. 29% of Czechs, 33% of Poles, 36% of Slovaks, and 46% of Hungarians report facing disinformation often or very often.
Global threat perception
Stance on Russia According to the GLOBSEC Trends 2022 surveys, there has been a significant spike in perception of Russia as a security threat among the CEE states between 2020 and 2022. In Poland, around 90% consider Russia as a threat to their country’s security (68% in 2020), compared with 84% of Czechs identifying Russia as a security threat to their country (43% in 2020), 62% of Slovaks (20% in 2020), and only 45% of Hungarians (25% in 2020).
Stance on China Fewer Central Europeans identify China as a security threat to their countries, however the negative perception of China has increased between 2020 and 2022. In Czechia, 51% identify China as a security threat, 43% in Poland, 29% in Slovakia, and only 21% in Hungary. Perception of the U.S. and Germany as strategic partners In Poland, 73% perceive the U.S. as a strategic partner for their country, compared to 41% of Czechs, 29% of Slovaks, and 13% of Hungarians. There is more enthusiasm among the CEE citizens when it comes to the perception of Germany as a strategic partner for their states. 74% of Czechs perceive Germany to be Czechia’s strategic partner, compared to 64% of Slovaks, 58% of Hungarians, and 48% of Poles.
Brezina, I., Boehnke, K., Deutsch, F., Jakab, Z., Klicperová-Baker, M., Przybylski, W., Čavojová, V., & Šrol, J. (2023). Democratic Trends in Central Europe (A Report on the Project Political Culture, Democratic Values and Misinformation: Detecting Democratic Footholds & Weaknesses). Centre for Social and Psychological Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences
Migration, gender equality, and climate change
Migration perceived as a threat 73% of Czech respondents declared that migrants threaten their identity and values. 68% of Slovak respondents, 59% of Hungarian respondents, and 51% of Polish respondents agreed with the same statement.
Attitude toward climate change Across the CEE, the attitudes toward climate change vary when compared to the EU average. According to the 2023 Eurobarometer Survey, 77% of Europeans think climate change is a very serious problem at this moment. 87% of Hungarian respondents, 69% of Polish respondents, 64% of Slovak respondents, and 48% of Czech respondents agree with the same statement. The same survey reveals that in 2023 63% of Europeans declared taking action to fight climate change. 72% of Slovaks admit to taking action to fight climate change, 61% of Hungarians, 47% of Czechs, and only 39% of Polish respondents admit to that.
Gender Equality While the EU’s Institute for Gender Equality research indicates that the conditions leading to greater equality between men and women have improved in the last three years, the Gender Equality Index (expressed as score from 1 to 100, where a score of 100 would mean that a country had reached full equality between men and women) in the CEE states has persisted at a lower rate than the EU average. In 2023, the Gender Equality Index reached 70.2 for the EU, 61.9 in Poland, 59.2 in Slovakia, 57.9 in Czechia, and 57.3 in Hungary.
Gender pay gap As of November 2022, the gender pay gap in the EU is at 13% (defined as the difference between the average gross hourly earnings of working men and women). In 2022, the gender pay gap in Poland is at 4.5%, the lowest among the CEE states and way below the EU average. However, the gender pay gap in Slovakia, Czechia and Hungary has remained significantly above the EU average, at 15.6%, 16.4%, and 17.2% respectively.
Attitudes towards LGBTI The Rainbow Index by ILGA Europe reflects how the laws and policies of each country impact the lives of LGBTI people on a scale of 0 (gross violations of human rights, discrimination) to 100% (respect of human rights, full equality). In 2022, Poland scored 13% on that scale, Czechia 26%, Hungary 30%, and Slovakia 34%.
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Download the PDF of the report
Participation in politics According to the data gathered by the Economist Intelligence Unit as part of the Democracy Index, the rate of political participation fell in Hungary and Slovakia, remained at the same level in Czechia, and recorded a slight increase in Poland between 2006 and 2022. 